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pension asset allocation decisions. Their study offers an interesting opportunity to highlight 
the importance of evidence-based policymaking in the field of financial reporting. I discuss 
some empirical challenges that the authors face to causally identify the effects they examine 
to show how a closer cooperation between academia and regulators can enable researchers to 
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1. Introduction 
The study by Barthelme et al. (2018) offers a stimulating opportunity to reflect on the 
importance of a closer cooperation between academia and policymakers to aid the production 
of rigorous scientific evidence which can in turn yield better policy interventions. This idea is 
often referred to as “evidence-based policymaking” (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Buijink 
2006; Leuz, 2018). 
The analysis in Barthelme et al. (2018) is of interest to accounting standard setters and 
policymakers because it documents an important real effect of accounting regulation. The 
authors examine whether a change in accounting rules for defined benefit pension plans alters 
firms’ pension asset allocation decisions. They document that the switch from IAS 19 to IAS 
19R in Germany—which eliminated the “corridor method” through which firms could defer 
the recognition of actuarial gains and losses—effectively shifts firms’ pension assets from 
equities to bonds (i.e., towards less risky investments). These findings are important because 
they can help understand the consequences of accounting regulation and, at the same time, 
have the potential to inform future regulatory action. 
Notwithstanding the credit that Barthelme et al. (2018) deserve, their analysis presents 
some empirical challenges that the authors share with most of the research that tries to 
identify the causal effects of changes in regulation. While Barthelme et al. (2018) carefully 
address many of the identification challenges related to self-selection and measurement issues 
by employing state-of-the-art econometric techniques, it is still important to think about how 
some of the potential caveats could affect the inferences they draw and the generalizability of 
their findings to other settings. Most importantly, reflecting on these caveats allows to 
understand how a closer cooperation between academia and standard setters could help 
researchers access better data and exploit settings that resemble “natural experiments” in that 
certain firms, for example, are exposed to rule changes (possibly in a staggered fashion), 
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whereas others are not. Such a cooperation could enable researchers to generate even more 
rigorous policy-relevant research (Leuz, 2018). 
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the gap between 
financial reporting research and policymaking. Section 3 summarizes the contribution of 
Barthelme et al. (2018). Section 4 focuses on the empirical challenges. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Gap between Financial Reporting Research and Policymaking  
Regulatory interventions by policymakers in the areas of financial markets and financial 
reporting regulation have been mainly based on unconventional cost-benefit analyses and 
seldom backed by scientific evidence provided by academic research (Buijink 2006; Schipper 
2010; Leuz, 2018). Only recently in fact, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) has started conducting more formal cost-benefit analyses to inform its regulatory 
actions. Similarly, it is not so long ago that the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have introduced post-
implementation reviews to evaluate the effectiveness of their standard setting processes. 
The above considerations beg the question of how to bridge the gap between financial 
reporting research and policymaking such that standard setters like the FASB and the IASB 
could rely—in a more systematic way—on policy-relevant academic research. This question 
is important because a closer link between financial reporting research and policymaking has 
the potential to minimize the costs of ill-designed policies that otherwise could be enormous. 
Drawing parallels from medical research where the use of randomized control trials 
(RCTs) is nowadays the gold standard, in a recent paper Leuz (2018) discusses the potential 
benefits (and challenges) of evidence-based policymaking and calls for increased cooperation 
between policymakers and academics, as well as for improved infrastructures to enable 
researchers to generate more policy-relevant research.  Absent this cooperation, an 
uncharitable characterization of financial reporting policymaking would view it—building on 
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the previous analogy to medical research—as on par with “medieval medicine” and hence 
mainly based on hunches and guesses, rather than on rigorous scientific evidence. 
An important consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of a policy intervention is 
the understanding of what would have happened in the absence of the specific intervention 
(i.e., the counterfactual) (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In the specific case of an accounting 
standard that has been recently mandated, policymakers would want to ideally know what 
would have happened (for example to market liquidity and cost of capital) if the accounting 
standard had not been introduced. The answer to this question is especially problematic in the 
field of accounting policy vis-à-vis medicine because practical—as well as ethical—reasons 
render RCTs arguably less feasible (Leuz, 2018). Nonetheless, the provision of effective 
policy recommendations rests on the possibility to identify causal effects. Yet, the possibility 
to draw causal inferences in the fields of economics, finance, and accounting often faces 
severe limitations since natural experiments are rare, treatment measurement is complex, and 
relevant data are generally lacking (Leuz, 2018). 
For the reasons highlighted above, empirical studies usually attempt to gauge treatment 
effects of policy interventions by relying on quasi-experiments. Inferences drawn from these 
studies, however, are often subject to caveats because: (i) policy interventions do not occur in 
a vacuum as economic and/or political reasons naturally drive regulatory actions, which in 
turn leads to selection concerns (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Leuz, 2018); (ii) policy 
interventions often target entire countries, which severely limits the possibility to identify 
reasonable control groups; (iii) policy interventions are usually introduced at one point in 
time, rather than in a staggered fashion, and hence concurrent unobservable factors may 
confound the identification of treatment effects. Moreover, even when studies provide very 
tight identification of treatment effects, then usually their settings are so peculiar that the 
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generalizability of their inferences to other settings becomes a concern (see Glaeser and Guay 
(2017) on this point). 
A closer cooperation between academia and policymakers has the potential to boost the 
production of more rigorous scientific evidence, which can in turn inform better regulatory 
actions. As suggested by Leuz (2018), policymakers could help researchers by improving 
access to data and/or by creating better conditions for the identification of causal effects. For 
example, regulators could launch pilot programs for the adoption of new standards, or 
introduce new standards in a staggered fashion to help researchers overcome identification 
challenges and produce more reliable evidence to support regulatory actions.1 
 
3. The Real Effects of Pension Accounting Regulation 
A large literature in accounting has focused on the real effects of disclosure (e.g., Kanodia, 
1980; 2006; Kanodia et al., 2004; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Kanodia and Sapra, 2016). The 
central tenet of the real effect hypothesis rests on the idea that accounting standards 
informing the measurement and disclosure of economic transactions produce important 
effects on the (real) decisions that companies make. Hence, under this view, a change in the 
financial reporting regime likely affects how firms acquire and allocate their resources. In this 
spirit, Barthelme et al. (2018) examine whether a change in accounting regulation for defined 
benefit pension plans affects firms’ pension asset allocation decisions. Specifically, 
Barthelme et al. (2018) contend and find that the transition from IAS 19 to IAS 19R in 
Germany, by eliminating the “corridor method,” which allowed firms to smooth equity 
volatility by deferring the recognition of actuarial gains and losses, effectively shifts firms’ 
                                                            
1 An interesting example in this respect is the 2005-2007 pilot program which was run by the SEC to provide 
evidence on the effects of removing short-sale restrictions. Like in a RCT, the SEC randomly selected one-third 
of the Russell 3000 companies and exempted them from short-sale restrictions previously in place (so called 
“uptick rule”). The exempted companies were effectively the “treated” subjects in the experiment, whereas the 
other companies served as “control” subjects. 
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pension assets from more volatile investments (e.g., equities) to less (e.g., bonds) volatile 
investments. 
The evidence in Barthelme et al. (2018) suggests that the adoption of IAS 19R by 
German listed firms leads to an average decrease in equity investments of 2.46 percentage 
points and to a corresponding average increase in bond investments of 4.61 percentage 
points. Their findings are consistent with an economically sizable “flight to safety” effect, in 
that after the introduction of IAS 19R firms rebalance their pension asset portfolios towards 
less volatile investments to counter the expected increase in pension-induced volatility. 
Barthelme et al. (2018) deserve special credit for addressing an important and timely 
question by exploiting an interesting setting. Their study, along with the concurrent work of 
Anantharaman and Chuk (2018), has the potential to offer relevant insight to policymakers 
and inform regulatory interventions by providing compelling evidence on the real effects of 
pension accounting regulation. This is especially important given the recent call for evidence-
based policymaking previously discussed (Leuz, 2018). 
Notwithstanding the merits of Barthelme et al. (2018), in the next section I discuss what 
I believe are some empirical challenges that the authors face in the identification of the 
effects of accounting regulation on pension asset allocation. First, I begin by discussing the 
different mechanisms through which the hypothesized effects can manifest themselves. 
Second, I delve into the self-selection issues potentially posing a challenge to the authors’ 
research design. Third, I focus on the role of managerial incentives. Fourth, I focus on the 
potential measurement issues with the response variables. Lastly, I discuss the extent to 
which the findings can be generalized. 
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4. Empirical Challenges  
4.1.  The Mechanisms 
Barthelme et al. (2018) posit that the effect of the transition from IAS 19 to IAS 19R on the 
pension asset allocation choices of German firms may occur through two different channels: 
(i) the other comprehensive income (OCI) channel, which operates through the elimination of 
the corridor method; and (ii) the effective rate of return (ERR) channel, which operates 
through the elimination of the ERR assumption for the calculation of the net periodic pension 
cost.  
Barthelme et al. (2018) provide evidence consistent with the OCI channel. They show 
that, once the German firms in their sample switch from the corridor method to the immediate 
recognition of actuarial gains and losses in OCI (i.e., the OCI method), the allocation of 
pension investments significantly shifts from equities to bonds. However, the effect of the 
pension rule change on pension asset allocation is—at least in theory—likely to be jointly 
determined by both mechanisms, i.e., the OCI channel and the ERR channel. Accordingly, in 
further tests the authors attempt to shed light on whether the ERR channel plays a role in their 
setting. The ERR channel rests on the idea that the elimination of the ERR assumption makes 
managers lose their incentive to allocate funds to risky pension investments (e.g., 
Bergstresser et al., 2006; Anantharaman and Chuk, 2018), which in turn should induce 
pension asset rebalancing towards safer investments. The evidence in Barthelme et al. (2018), 
which is based on a sample of German firms transitioning from IAS 19 to IAS 19R, does not 
support this alternative mechanism. 
In a different setting, Anantharaman and Chuk (2018) show that the ERR channel does 
explain changes in pension asset allocation. Specifically, by comparing pension investments 
of Canadian firms adopting IAS 19R with those of a control group of U.S. firms not 
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experiencing the pension policy change, they document a significant reduction in the 
proportion of equity investments. 
I view the evidence in Barthelme et al. (2018) and Anantharaman and Chuk (2018) as 
complementary. Leveraging on very different institutional settings, these studies document 
important real effects of pension accounting regulation highlighting two distinct channels 
through which these effects obtain. Nonetheless, an important—yet unanswered—question is 
why the documented effects are attributable to different channels conditional on the setting 
being investigated. One potential explanation, which Barthelme et al. (2018) examine, is the 
spread between ERRs and discount rates. While spreads are relatively low in Germany, these 
seem to be more pronounced in Canada, which would also be consistent with the findings in 
Anantharaman and Chuk (2018). However, in the interest of generalizability, future research 
could explore more in depth the role of institutional features and why specific channels are 
more likely to produce effects depending on the context examined. This is especially 
important considering the previous discussion regarding evidence-informed policymaking, as 
one would want to appreciate: (i) the extent to which inferences drawn from one setting 
reasonably generalize to others (see the discussion on external validity in Section 4.5); and 
(ii) whether the relative importance of a specific channel is contingent on the specific features 
of the institutional setting being investigated (i.e., whether there are institutional 
complementarities). 
 
4.2. Self-Selection Issues 
Barthelme et al. (2018) hypothesize that the change in pension accounting rules following the 
introduction of IAS 19R induces firms to rebalance their pension asset investments. To test 
their prediction, the authors exploit a quasi-experiment provided by the German market. The 
key feature of their setting is that, prior to the revision of IAS 19, listed German firms could 
choose between the OCI method and the corridor method. Once, as of 2012, IAS 19R 
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replaces IAS 19, the corridor method is not an option anymore, effectively leaving no choice 
but to switch to those firms previously opting for the corridor method. Leveraging on this 
feature of their setting, Barthelme et al. (2018) compare (in a difference-in-differences 
framework) pension asset allocation decisions before and after IAS 19R between a treatment 
sample of switchers (i.e., firms previously using the corridor method then switching to the 
OCI method) and a control sample of non-switchers (i.e., firms that already use the OCI 
method before the accounting rule change). 
To reliably estimate the causal effect of the accounting rule change on firms’ pension 
investment decisions, an important assumption is that observations are randomly assigned to 
treatment group and control group. As this is unlikely to be the case in this setting, because 
control firms voluntarily adopt the OCI method before the rule change and hence are 
untreated by choice, the research design may suffer from a self-selection issue. To mitigate 
this endogeneity concern, the authors use propensity score matching effectively relying on a 
bias-corrected difference-in-differences estimator for average treatment effects (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2011). 
While the use of propensity score matching has the potential to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns due to self-selection, this method can only control for differences in observable 
characteristics between treatment and control observations, which naturally limits its efficacy. 
In fact, unobservable time-varying factors that differ across treatment and control 
observations could still induce a potential selection bias in the difference-in-differences 
estimates. Moreover, while propensity score matching is particularly effective for large 
samples, when sample sizes are small, it becomes difficult to generalize estimates outside 
common support. 
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While the considerations above virtually apply to any quasi-experimental setting in 
which selection issues are a concern, Barthelme et al. (2018) carefully acknowledge this 
limitation when discussing their findings.  
Future research, potentially relying on cross-country samples, could use firms from 
other countries to construct a synthetic control group (e.g., Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) to 
more effectively alleviate selection issues. The idea would be to use a weighted combination 
of control sample observations from different countries to estimate what would have 
happened to the treated observations absent the treatment (i.e., counterfactual pension asset 
allocation decisions). The advantage of this approach vis-à-vis other methods is that it can 
account for the influence of time-varying confounders through the weighting of control 
sample observations to achieve a better match with treated observations before the latter 
receive the treatment. 
Importantly, as already mentioned, these common identification challenges could be 
effectively overcome with a closer cooperation between researchers and policymakers. In 
fact, if in the future accounting standards were to be introduced through pilot programs in a 
similar fashion to RCTs, the inferences drawn from academic studies would be certainly 
more policy-relevant. 
 
4.3. The Role of Managerial Incentives 
When Barthelme et al. (2018) explore the link between change in pension accounting rules 
and pension asset allocation decisions, the contend that, through the OCI channel, the reduced 
proportion of equity investments is likely due to managers’ incentives to keep the volatility of 
their firms’ equity under control. This compelling argument is predicated on the assumption 
that managerial incentives play an important role as the observed reduced proportion of 
equity investments over total pension assets is likely to be jointly determined by the 
interaction of changes in accounting rules and managers’ reporting incentives.  
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 Following the above argument, it is therefore reasonable to assume that capital 
structure considerations, as well as managerial compensation arrangements, may, for 
example, moderate the effect of the rule change on pension asset allocation. With respect to 
capital structure, high credit-risk firms (or firms that are close to violating a covenant) may be 
especially sensitive to increases in pension-induced equity volatility and hence exhibit larger 
effects in terms of portfolio rebalancing towards safer asset classes. As for managerial 
compensation, Anantharaman and Lee (2014) provide evidence that top management 
compensation structures are an important driver of corporate pension policy. Specifically, 
Anantharaman and Lee (2014) document risk-shifting activities through pension 
underfunding for executives whose compensation packages exhibit high wealth-risk 
sensitivities. Taken together, these considerations reinforce the argument that managerial 
incentives constitute important factors in the relation between changes in accounting rules 
and pension investment decisions, which are worthy of further exploration. 
While the focus in Barthelme et al. (2018) is on the average effect of the rule change on 
pension investment decisions, they account for the role of managerial incentives as controls 
(rather than moderating factors), to mitigate the concern that incentives per se could be 
responsible for the observed outcome. To this end, the authors include in their difference-in-
differences model specifications firm leverage and percentage of free float to capture capital 
structure incentives related to credit risk and compensation-related incentives, respectively. 
This strategy effectively purges variation in the response variables that is due to differences 
in time-invariant incentives across treatment and control observations. 
In summary, whereas I believe the exploration of managerial incentives as moderating 
factors would render the study of the effects investigated richer, Barthelme et al. (2018) opt 
for considering managerial incentives as factors to control for. I contend, however, that the 
inclusion of incentives as controls is likely problematic if one believes that incentives 
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themselves may be affected by the treatment. It is in fact not unreasonable to think, for 
example, that following the rule change firms may renegotiate their executives’ compensation 
packages or their debt contracts to counter the (expected) increased in equity volatility. If this 
is the case, managerial incentives may represent “bad controls” as defined in Angrist and 
Pischke (2009) because these could lead to inconsistent estimates of treatment effects. 
Luckily though, this concern is mitigated in the context of Barthelme et al. (2018) as their 
univariate difference-in-differences evidence is in line with their multivariate effects, which 
is thus reassuring. 
 
4.4. Outcome Variables 
Barthelme et al. (2018) are interested in documenting the effect of the change in pension 
accounting regulation on pension investment allocations across different asset classes. In line 
with their main prediction, the anticipated increase in pension-induced equity volatility is 
expected to shift investments from equities to bonds. Accordingly, the authors measure equity 
(bond) investments as the percentage of pension assets allocated to equity (bond) securities to 
capture the relative proportion of equities (bonds) on total pension assets. Along with 
investments in equities and bonds however, firms can also allocate their pension investments 
towards alternative assets such as real estate, stocks in hedge funds, insurance contracts, etc. 
To capture the percentage of pension assets allocated to investments other than equities, 
bonds, and real estate, the authors use a “catch all” variable labeled %OTHER. The 
proportion of pension assets allocated to other investments appears to be sizable and, most 
importantly, increasing after the introduction of IAS 19R (from 15.2% to 18.1%). The fact 
that the allocation of pension investments to the (arguably less transparent) %OTHER 
category increases when IAS 19R replaces IAS 19 raises the question of whether managers: 
(i) indeed increase the proportion of pension investments in assets other than equities and 
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bonds; (ii) use their discretion to strategically classify their pension investments under this 
residual category; or (iii) engage in both these strategies. 
The authors conduct sensitivity tests to allay the concern that the documented results 
could be affected by potential measurement error in their dependent variables. Specifically, 
they exclude from their full sample observations for which %OTHER is equal to, or greater 
than, 25%. While these tests have the potential to alleviate measurement error concerns, they 
still leave two important questions unanswered. First, what type of pension investments fall 
into this residual category? Second, do—and if so to what extent—managers engage in 
classification shifting when changes in pension accounting rules occur? Unfortunately, data 
limitations due to current disclosure requirements preclude Barthelme et al. (2018) to 
examine these questions. Nevertheless, if disclosure standards were to allow for finer 
disaggregation of information in pension asset disclosures in the years to come, future 
research may shed light on these important issues. 
 
4.5. Generalizability of Empirical Findings 
If policymakers such as accounting standard setters are to increasingly base their regulatory 
interventions on the empirical evidence produced by accounting and financial markets 
research, the extent to which inferences drawn from a study generalize beyond the features of 
the specific research setting investigated becomes especially important (Glaeser and Guay, 
2017; Leuz, 2018). 
As the quasi-experimental setting in Barthelme et al. (2018) is provided by German 
listed firms that experience the transition from IAS 19 to IAS 19R, it is crucial to understand 
whether their inferences can reasonably apply beyond their German “laboratory.” Ideally, 
policymakers would want to know whether the transition from IAS 19 to IAS 19R induces an 
average reduction in equity investments of 2.46 percentage points also for firms domiciled in 
other countries experiencing the same accounting rule change. Moreover, policymakers 
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would also be interested in knowing whether the same channel responsible for the pension 
investment effects documented in the German setting—the OCI channel—is also likely to 
represent the mechanism through which pension asset allocation decisions would be affected 
by the same accounting rule change in other settings. The authors are very careful in their 
discussion of the external validity of their findings and call for further research to explore 
different settings to gauge the real effects of pension accounting rules. 
The above discussion highlights the importance of comparing the evidence produced by 
a “mosaic of studies” (Glaeser and Guay, 2018) to better understand whether, and to what 
extent, the causal effects of policy changes hinge on the specific features of the context 
examined. It is therefore with this perspective in mind that one needs to assess the way in 
which the findings in Anantharaman and Chuk (2018) for Canada and Barthelme et al. (2018) 
for Germany complement each other. While the evidence in Barthelme et al. (2018) is 
consistent with the elimination of the corridor method being the mechanism behind the 
documented pension allocation effects for German firms, Anantharaman and Chuk (2018) 
show that, for Canadian firms, the reduced risk-taking in pension asset allocation after the 
introduction of IAS 19R occurs because managers face lower incentives to invest in risky 
assets to justify larger ERRs.  
Further research is needed to understand why the mechanisms through which the real 
effects of pension accounting rule changes manifest themselves are context-specific and to 
what extent the evidence from these studies can inform financial reporting policymaking. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Barthelme et al. (2018) examine the real effects of pension accounting regulation. Their 
evidence suggests that the adoption of IAS 19R by German listed firms leads to a sizable 
decrease in equity investments and to a corresponding increase in bond investments, which 
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supports the idea that firms rebalance their pension asset portfolios towards less volatile 
investments to counter the expected increase in pension-induced volatility.  
The study of Barthelme et al. (2018) offers an interesting opportunity to reflect on the 
challenges that academics face when attempting to identify the causal effects of regulatory 
interventions. While researchers typically resort to econometric techniques to keep these 
challenges “under control,” a closer cooperation between researchers and policymakers has 
the potential to stimulate the production of even more policy-relevant research. 
 15 
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